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Short form for the title: Assessing the effects of local taxation
ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF LOCAL TAXATION USING
MICROGEOGRAPHIC DATA ∗
Gilles Duranton, Laurent Gobillon, and Henry G. Overman
We study the impact of local taxation on the location and growth of firms. Our empirical method-
ology pairs establishments across jurisdictional boundaries to estimate the impact of taxation. Our
approach improves on existing work as it corrects for unobserved establishment heterogeneity, for
unobserved time-varying site-specific effects, and for the endogeneity of local taxation. Applied to
data for English manufacturing establishments, we find that local taxation has a negative impact
on employment growth, but no effect on entry.
jel classification: H22, H71, R38.
This paper develops new empirical methodologies to identify the effects of local taxa-
tion on the location and growth of firms. This issue has been the focus of an extensive
theoretical literature and our paper is not the first paper to consider these issues em-
pirically.1 Bartik (1991) summarises the earlier literature. Evidence from the 1960s and
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1One can identify at least three strands of theoretical literature. The issue of tax competition has received
considerable attention. See Wilson (1999) for a review. A similarly lengthy debate has centred around local
public good provision and the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis that inter-jurisdictional competition helps achieve
the efficient provision of local public goods. See Epple and Nechyba (2004) for a recent review. Finally,
capitalisation of local taxes and the efficient taxation of land are key concerns for urban economists. This
has been a subject of discussion since George (1884). See Fujita (1989) for a presentation of the arguments
and Arnott (2004) for a recent discussion of its applicability.
1
1970s suggested there was no effect of taxes on firm location decisions. Bartik’s own work
focusing on the 1980s suggested a negative relationship and a number of subsequent
papers have confirmed that finding. Much of this work used fairly large spatial units
(mostly us states). More recent work (e.g., Guimaraes et al., 2004) has moved towards
smaller spatial units such as us counties with similar results.
The existing literature, however, has failed to resolve three main problems when assess-
ing this impact. First, firms are faced with the choice of a large number of heterogenous
locations. Many of these site’s characteristics are unobserved and likely to be correlated
with other explanatory variables such as plant characteristics and local taxation, thus
biasing the results. Second, firms themselves are heterogenous. Again much of this
heterogeneity is unobservable so that the sorting of firms according to these characteristics
provides another source of bias. Third, aspects of the tax system may be endogenous to
firm decisions, which may lead to a reverse causality bias.
Our approach is to use spatial differencing, time differencing and instrumenting to
solve for these three identification problems. Our use of panel techniques to condition out
firm heterogeneity is standard. To solve for unobserved time-varying site characteristics
and the endogeneity of local taxation, we show that neither spatial differencing nor instru-
menting alone suffices. Instead, a combination of the two is needed. Spatial differencing
conditions out local characteristics. In turn this makes the exclusion restriction associated
with our instrumentation strategy plausible. That is, without spatial differencing the
absence of correlation between our political instruments and unobserved time-varying
local conditions would be unlikely. When applying our methodology to data for English
manufacturing establishments we find that local taxation of non-residential property has
a sizeable negative impact on employment growth, but no effect on entry. We show
that methodologies that do not address these three problems give substantively different
results.
That a tax on non-residential property (which applies to both land and buildings)
should affect employment might seem surprising. Our model shows how well documented
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rigidities in rents imply that tax increases may not fully capitalise and thus negatively
affect employment. In addition, our model shows how revaluations of properties in
case of expansions can magnify those effects and explain why local employment may
be severely affected by local taxation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 1 we outline our methodology
and relate it to the existing literature. Section 2 outlines our data. Section 3 presents our
findings on the impact of local taxation on employment while section 4 presents results
for entry. Section 5 concludes.
1. Methodology
1.1. Model
To start, it is useful to recall some standard results about the taxation of fixed factors.2
Taxes on land and existing buildings are expected to be fully capitalised into property val-
ues. As a result, when buildings remain in fixed supply, rental prices for non-residential
properties should be unaffected by local taxation. In turn, this suggests that establish-
ments’ employment choices should also be unaffected. The only channel through which
property taxation (which taxes both land and buildings) matters is that it acts as a tax on
the construction of new buildings and the extension of existing ones. If the supply of new
buildings is perfectly elastic everywhere and firms can move at no cost, all construction
(and thus employment growth) will take place where taxes are lowest. Hence, small
differences in property taxes can have large employment effects in the simplest of settings.
In reality, we expect two complications that should greatly attenuate this result. First,
firms face significant moving costs. Second, the excess burden of property tax increases
should be small since property taxation only affects investment in buildings, arguably a
small fraction of firms’ expenditures. In such a setting, it is hard to imagine that local
taxation has a sizeable effect on employment.
2See, among others, Wellisch (2000) for a detailed discussion.
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For the sake of even greater realism and to explain how local taxation may have first-
order effects on employment, we consider a richer model that embeds several aspects
of our institutional setting.3 Specifically, we allow for rigidities in rent setting which
imply that property taxation affects the overall rental costs of properties (and not only
the costs of expansion). Property revaluations (which determine the tax base) occur in
case of building expansion. They magnify the effects of an increase in property tax so that
property taxation can indeed act as a major break on local employment growth by limiting
the expansion of establishments if they stay or by forcing them to move away if they want
to grow.
We now describe the details of our model. Establishments use labour and building
space to produce a final good.4 To keep things simple assume that building space and
labour are perfect complements.5 By choice of units, one unit of building and one unit of
labour are needed to produce one unit of the final good. The unit rental cost of buildings
in jurisdiction a comprises two elements: the building rent, ba, and the local tax, referred
to in the uk as business rates, ra. Building rents are endogenously determined in a way
described below. Consistent with our empirical setting we assume that the tax is paid by
occupiers, not landlords. It is the product of a rate, which varies across jurisdictions, times
the historical value of the building.
We take labour as numeraire. The price of the final good is exogenous, common across
all jurisdictions, and equal to 1 + p. Establishments live for up to two periods and new
establishments can enter every period. During an establishment’s first period, demand
for their good is normalised to unity. Period 1 profit of an establishment i initially located
in jurisdiction a at time t is given by
pi1at(i) = (p− bat − rat) (1)
3The uk rates system is further described below. See also Hale and Travers (1994).
4We use the term establishments to refer to our basic units of observation. In the data that we use, these
are sometimes part of larger multi-establishment firms. We ignore the complications this introduces.
5As long as labour and buildings remain gross complements, qualitatively similar results are obtained.
Gross complementarity between building and labour is a natural assumption for most sectors.
4
In their second period, firms face a shock to the demand for their final good and a tax
shock.6 The second period tax, rat+1, is the realisation of a random draw r˜at+1 from a
distribution f (.) over [r, r] at the beginning of period t + 1. This is consistent with our
empirical setting where the tax is fully decentralised and set freely by each jurisdiction
every year.7 We assume that r ≥ 0 and that r is not too high in a sense made clear below.
Demand in the second period is given by 1+ ρit+1 where ρit+1 is a realisation of a random
draw ρ˜it+1 from a continuous distribution g(.) over the support [−1, ρ] with ρ > 0 taking
place again at the beginning of period t + 1. Firms respond differently to negative and
positive shocks and we consider each in turn.
We rule out the possibility that establishments can renegotiate rents downwards in
response to either a tax or a demand shock. This helps limit the number of possible
firm responses that we need to consider. It is also consistent with the institutional setting
during our period of analysis when most industrial establishments sign long term rental
contracts of 20 years or more with a review of the rent only every five years or so. Even at
the time of rent reviews, scope for adjustment is limited because virtually all commercial
contracts in the uk include an upward only clause (Crosby et al., 1998). In light of this,
we assume that new establishments sign a lease in t which sets building rent for both t
and t + 1. For simplicity and without affecting the qualitative nature of our results, we
assume bat = bat+1. We will return to this issue below in discussing when rents respond
to changes in local taxes.
Given that rent cannot be reduced, after a negative shock, ρi < 0, an establishment
wants to either exit or downsize.8 Exit leads to second period profit pi2t+1(i) = piE(i) = 0
where the subscript E stands for exit. Downsizing occurs through subletting part of the
original building unit. In the uk, commercial contracts give tenants ‘the right to sell or
6To keep our model transparent we use shocks affecting demand for final goods. We could instead use
productivity shocks with a fully specified demand system to derive similar results.
7While we consider an exogenous tax shock, our empirical analysis worries about endogeneity.
8Another alternative would be to relocate and leave the existing lease. To keep the number of options
manageable, we assume that moving cost, c, would make this alternative prohibitively costly. More pre-
cisely, we assume c > bat + r − b where b is the unit rental costs of buildings when subletting (as defined
below).
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sublet the unexpired term of the lease, with landlords being unable to withhold their
consent unreasonably’ (Crosby et al., 1998, p. 3). We assume that subletting part of the
initial unit of building yields a unit rent b where b < bat + rat+1 in equilibrium. That is,
firms cannot make profits by subletting. Downsizing to satisfy the new level of demand
and renting unused building space implies second period profit pi2t+1(i) = piD(i) = (1 +
ρi)p− ρib− bat − rat+1.
Following a positive demand shock, ρi ≥ 0, an establishment has three options. First, it
can grow by expanding employment and building space on its current site.9 The unit rent
for extra building space is bat+1, the same as for the original unit of building. The main
issue with increasing the amount of building space on a given site is that, in our setting,
it typically led to a revaluation of the building (Hale and Travers, 1994). This change in
the tax base implies that the unit rate increases for the expansion as well as the original
unit. We assume that revaluation leads the value of the tax base to be multiplied by δ > 1.
Profit in this case is pi2t+1(i) = piG(i) = (1+ ρi)(p− bat − δrat+1).
Alternatively, an establishment can decide to forego this expansion opportunity and
continue to produce only one unit of final good. Profit when staying the same is pi2t+1(i) =
piS(i) = p− bat − rat+1. Finally an establishment can incur cost c and relocate to another
jurisdiction where the unit rental cost of buildings is equal to b such that in equilibrium
b < b < bat + δrat+1. Profit in case of relocation is pi2t+1(i) = piR(i) = (1+ ρi)(p− b)− c.
Hence, depending on its demand shock, ρit+1, and the level of tax in period t+ 1, rat+1,
an establishment faces five possible choices: exit (leading to second period profit piE),
downsize (leading to piD), stay put (piS), grow (piG), or relocate (piR).
We now define four thresholds, ρED(rat+1), ρDS(rat+1), ρSG(rat+1), and ρGR(rat+1).
They correspond to particular realisations of ρ such that an establishment is indifferent
between exit and downsize, between downsize and stay at its original size, between stay
at its original size and grow locally, or between grow locally and relocate, respectively.
Provided the tax, rat+1, is not too high and relocation costs, c, are large enough, the
9It could also occur by renting adjacent sites. We ignore this possibility here.
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above expressions for piE, piD, piS, piG, and piR imply −1 ≤ ρED(rat+1) < ρDS(rat+1) <
ρSG(rat+1) < ρGR(rat+1). Establishments that face very negative demand shocks prefer to
exit. For a less negative shock, they remain in business but downsize. For a small positive
shock, establishments retain their original size. For an intermediate positive shock, they
grow. For a large positive shock, they choose to relocate. We briefly explain the ranking
of each of these thresholds in turn.
Because establishments that remain in business are stuck with their lease and because
they can sublet below the rental cost they face, establishments which experience a large
negative demand shock exit rather than downsize to a very small size. Interestingly,
∂ρED(rat+1)/∂rat+1 > 0. That is, a higher tax in t + 1 induces more exits. More exits
also imply that surviving establishments are those that have experienced a less negative
demand shock.
Next, it is easy to show that ρDS(rat+1) = 0. Establishments that face a small negative
shock are left with unnecessary building space. They prefer to sublet it rather than
leave it empty. Establishments that face a small positive shock would like to expand.
However, adding building space implies a revaluation of the tax base and a higher tax.
Whenever the demand shock is positive, but not large enough to offset this increase in
the tax, establishments prefer to keep their original size instead of expanding. Hence,
ρSG(rat+1) > 0. It is also easy to see that ∂ρSG(rat+1)/∂rat+1 > 0. A higher tax in t + 1
makes the cost of a revaluation higher and thus can only be justified for larger demand
shocks. That is, for establishments that remain in jurisdiction a, a higher rate of taxation
leads to lower employment growth on average.
Finally, establishments that face a large enough positive demand shock prefer to relo-
cate. The fixed cost of relocation can only be justified for those establishments that need
to expand a lot. Because a higher tax implies a greater gain from relocation, we have
∂ρGR(rat+1)/∂rat+1 < 0.
To close the model, we assume a competitive land market for new establishments. Free
entry means that establishments enter until they make zero expected profit E(Πat) =
7
pi1at + E(pi
2
t+1) = 0 and bat adjust to ensure this holds across all jurisdictions.
10 Put
differently, when new entrants sign contracts current and expected future taxes are fully
capitalised in bat. However, the realisation of rat+1 is not capitalised for continuing estab-
lishments. Loosely speaking, taxes are capitalised in the long run but not in the short run.
Furthermore, clearing on the land market implies that more exits and more relocations in
a jurisdiction are matched by more entries when the supply of sites is fixed (a reasonable
assumption for the uk).
The main result of our model is thus that the tax rate affects the use of building space
by establishments. In turn, the complementarity between factors implies that taxation
affects the employment decision of establishments. There are two separate channels.
Higher taxes lead to both a growth slow-down and a selection effect. More precisely, higher
taxes reduce employment growth by inducing more establishments to keep their size
constant instead of growing. The growth slow-down effect is driven entirely by building
revaluations that lead to higher taxes and make small expansions unprofitable. In terms of
selection, higher taxes in t + 1 imply more exits for establishments with a negative shock
and more relocations for establishments with a positive shock. The selection effect is thus
ambiguous. The selection effect is driven by imperfect capitalisation of higher taxes into
rents for existing establishments. This affects the local profitability of establishments and,
in turn, their location choice.11
Overall, the effect of higher taxes on employment in the establishments that stay is
thus ambiguous. Higher taxes lead to less employment when selection through exits is
10Developing this expression is not very enlightening. When rat+1 and ρt+1 are independent, expected
profit is well defined and equal to E(Πat) = pi1at +
∫ r
r
∫ ρ
−1 pi
2∗
t+1(rat+1, ρt+1) f (rat+1)g(ρt+1)drat+1dρt+1 where
pi2∗t+1(rat+1, ρt+1) is optimal second-period profit.
11As discussed at the start of this subsection, there is imperfect capitalisation because of the combination
of rigid rents, uncertainty about future taxes, and costly relocation. Without rent rigidity, renegotiation in
a competitive land market implies full capitalisation of rat+1 into bat+1. Without uncertainty, rat+1 would
be capitalised into the initial level of rent bat just like rat since new establishments face a competitive land
market. Finally, without costly adjustment, establishments could leave their lease and negotiate a new one
competitively.
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dominated by selection through relocation and the growth slow-down effect.12 In our
empirical analysis, we can estimate an overall effect but cannot identify the selection and
growth slow down effects separately.
Our model also offers some predictions about entry. Through the selection effect, higher
taxes imply more exits and more relocations. In turn, this should lead to more entries. In
the second part of the paper, we assess the effect of taxes on entries.
We could extend our framework to incorporate other factors of production. The tax
could cause establishments to change their use of these other inputs. In turn, this could
impact on employment. Because of these omitted inputs, we need to be cautious about
the interpretation of our results. Specifically, we are only able to estimate the overall effect
of taxation on employment even though other cross-factor effects may be at work.13
Because higher taxes affect the employment of establishments, a naive reading of our
model would lead us to estimate
eit = αrat + eit (2)
where eit is the log employment of establishment i at time t and eit an error term that
captures the demand shock ρit in reduced form. The main parameter of interest is α. It
captures the (net) effect on employment of the (log) local tax, rat.
1.2. Heterogenous Establishments and Heterogenous Locations
Unlike in the model, we expect production establishments to be very heterogenous ex-ante
and much of this heterogeneity to be unobservable. This is a first likely source of bias if
establishments with different unobserved characteristics sort across jurisdictions with dif-
ferent tax rates. We can enrich the specification (2) and add establishment characteristics:
eit = αrat + Xitβ+ µi + eit (3)
12We note that these effects can be quantitatively large. If in a jurisdiction there are lots of establishments
just below ρGR, a further unexpected increase in taxation can lead to many relocations and a much lower
growth rate in employment for remaining establishments.
13The effects of taxation may also vary across places. See, for instance, Baldwin et al. (2004). In this paper
we only estimate an average effect.
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where β captures the effect of time-varying establishment-specific observable variables,
Xit. An establishment fixed effect, µi, captures the impact of unobservable time invariant
establishment characteristics.
The second issue to consider is that not all sites are the same. There are a large number
of heterogenous sites and these sites come at very different rental prices. For instance,
Thompson and Tsolacos (2001) document a sixfold difference in the rental price between
industrial sites close to Heathrow airport and those in the suburbs of Leeds. It is unlikely
that these differences in rents only reflect differences in local taxation.
Traditional empirical approaches have worried about the fact that the costs of factors of
production differ across geographical regions. We are also concerned with heterogeneity
at a much finer geographical scale. A wide variety of factors affect both the attractiveness
of sites and the success of establishments once they choose their site. For example, the
attractiveness of a site may depend on access to the road network while improvements to
that network may affect the performance of establishments at that site. Similarly, changes
in congestion can have different implications for establishments located close, but not
very close to one another as can the entry or exit of big buyers or suppliers. Overall, there
are many reasons to expect considerable site heterogeneity, possibly at a very fine spatial
scale, and varying over time.
If this is the case, assessing the impact of taxation requires us to control for both fixed
and time-varying site characteristics since they are likely to be correlated with taxes or the
demand shock for establishments. Some of these site characteristics may be observable
and thus can be controlled for directly. However many are likely to be unobservable. This
implies that we are interested in a specification like
eit = αrat + Xitβ+ µi + γa + θzt + eit (4)
where γa is a time-invariant effect for jurisdiction a and θzt is a time-varying effect for
location z, possibly at a finer spatial scale than a. Note that the establishment fixed effects
also control for unobserved time-invariant site-specific effects (if establishments do not
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move) leaving θzt to control for unobserved time-varying site-specific effects.14
Estimating (4) by ols ignoring the unobservable effects gives a consistent estimate of α
and β only if Cov ([rat, Xit] , µi + γa + θzt + eit) = 0. This condition is unlikely to hold, if
only because observable establishment characteristics Xit are likely to be correlated with
unobservable establishment characteristics µi. Hence, estimating (4) by ols is unlikely to
yield a consistent estimate of α.
1.3. Time Differencing
As a first step, and to control for establishment and jurisdictional fixed effects we can use
the panel dimension of our data to calculate the within estimator (alternatively, we could
calculate the first-difference estimator). The within transformation is obtained, as usual,
by centring all observations around their mean. For any variable y, for observation i, let
yi denote the time average and define y˜it ≡ yit − yi. We can then rewrite equation (4) as:
e˜it = αr˜at + X˜itβ+ θ˜zt + e˜it (5)
So far our approach for dealing with heterogenous establishments and time-invariant
spatial heterogeneity is standard. Because we have a panel of establishment data, we
are able to control for observed time-varying characteristics of establishments, as well
as condition out unobserved time-invariant characteristics of both establishments and
jurisdictions through the inclusion of establishment and jurisdiction fixed effects.
This specification will give consistent estimates of α and β if Cov
([
r˜at, X˜it
]
, θ˜zt + e˜it
)
=
0. This condition, although weaker than that necessary for consistency of ols, is still
unlikely to hold because, in a spatial context, the site-specific effect θzt is likely to be
correlated across neighbouring sites. This raises the possibility that, within a jurisdiction,
there could be omitted variables driving both the average site-specific effect and the tax
rate. That is, rat is likely to be correlated with θzt. Hence, although it conditions out
14Empirically, we cannot separately identify the time-invariant establishment-specific and jurisdiction-
specific effects because we condition both out using establishment fixed effects.
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time-invariant characteristics of both establishments and jurisdictions, time differencing
is not enough to obtain consistent estimates of α.
1.4. Instrumenting
The standard way to deal with the correlation between rat and θzt would be to find a
suitable instrument for the tax rate. In our context, one possibility is to use local political
variables (denoted sat) to instrument for tax rates. We expect political parties to set local
taxes differently. For instance, local authorities controlled by the (left-wing) Labour party
are likely to set higher taxes than (right-wing) Conservative ones. More subtly, we also
expect a local authority with a strong Labour majority to set higher taxes than a local
authority with small Labour majority. Changes in these political variables are highly
likely to cause changes in local tax rates (i.e., they satisfy the relevance condition for a
suitable instrument). The crucial issue is whether they satisfy the exogeneity condition
Cov(s˜at, θ˜zt + e˜it) = 0. In this respect note that changes in θzt are likely to be correlated
across sites within jurisdictions while changes to the ‘average’ θzt in a jurisdiction may
be correlated with changes in voting behaviour. That votes at local elections should be
determined by local conditions is a very real possibility and would suggest a correlation
between political variables, s˜at, and unobserved local effects, θ˜zt. In turn, this would
violate our exclusion restriction and yield inconsistent estimates for α. Since it is unclear
to us what would be a variable that determines local taxation but is uncorrelated with
local conditions, we conclude that instrumenting for local taxation while estimating (5) is
unlikely to solve our inference problem.
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1.5. Spatial Differencing
An alternative to instrumenting is spatial differencing in the spirit of Holmes (1998) or
Black (1999).15 Define ∆d as the spatial difference operator which takes the difference
between each establishment and any other establishment located at distance less than d
from that establishment. Applying this spatial difference operator to (5) gives:
∆d e˜it = α∆dr˜at +∆dX˜itβ+∆dθ˜zt +∆de˜it (6)
Now, we impose the crucial identifying assumption that site-specific effects change
smoothly across space. That is, for d sufficiently small ∆dθ˜zt ≈ 0. Noting also that taxes
will be the same for establishments within the same jurisdiction, this gives us:
∆d e˜it = ∆dX˜itβ+∆de˜it (7)
for establishments in the same jurisdiction and:
∆d e˜it = α∆dr˜at + β∆dX˜it +∆de˜it (8)
for establishments across jurisdictional boundaries. This shows that we can use neigh-
bouring establishments located across jurisdictional boundaries to identify the effects of
taxation. We can also use neighbouring establishments within the same jurisdiction to im-
prove our estimates of the effect of establishment-specific variables. Estimating equation
(6) will give consistent estimates of α and β if Cov
([
∆dr˜at,∆dX˜it
]
,∆de˜it
)
= 0.
Theoretically, assuming θ˜zt varies continuously across space, then ∆dθ˜zt = 0 will
hold for arbitrarily small distances and spatial differencing alone will provide consistent
estimates. In practice, however, because we need enough observations to conduct our
estimation we may have to spatial difference across establishments that are too far apart
to ensure ∆dθ˜zt = 0. Continuity of θ˜zt ensures that shocks to neighbouring establishments
are correlated within jurisdictions so if tax rates are endogenous to local conditions, then in
15The methodology proposed by Holmes (1998) and Black (1999) has been repeated elsewhere, but most
applications only use cross-sectional data and do not address endogeneity. The three exceptions are Gibbons
and Machin (2003) who consider endogeneity and Kahn (2004) and Chirinko and Wilson (2008) who use
some longitudinal information. Our analysis improves on these existing methodologies by incorporating
instrumented panel data techniques into the spatial discontinuity approach.
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practice spatial differencing alone will reduce, but not eliminate the correlation between
changes to tax rates and local shocks.
1.6. Instrumenting and Spatial Differencing
Instrumenting and spatial differencing, when used ‘alone’ are not fully satisfactory. In-
strumenting is imperfect because instruments that determine local tax rates are likely to
be correlated with unobserved time varying local effects. Spatial differencing is imperfect
because, in practice, it may not remove all the endogeneity of local taxes. This suggests
that combining both approaches can allow the proper identification of α. To do so we need
to use appropriately transformed political variables: ∆d s˜at.
Using these instruments together with spatial differencing gives consistent estimates
provided Cov(∆d s˜at,∆dθ˜zt +∆de˜it) = 0. This condition is weaker than the corresponding
condition when using iv without spatial differencing because ∆d removes any compon-
ent that varies smoothly across space and drives both political shares and site-specific
effects. It is also weaker than the corresponding condition when using spatial differencing
without iv because we use only the variation in changes in tax rates that is explained by
changes in local elections.
Before turning to the implementation, note that spatial differencing and the within
transformation have implications for the error structure. As usual, implementing (8)
yields consistent estimates for the coefficients but does not give the correct standard errors.
Appendix A shows how to correct the standard errors.16
2. Data
To implement our methodology, we need data satisfying a number of requirements. First,
we need to have a panel of individual establishment level data. Cross-sectional data do
not allow us to use the within transformation to remove establishment and jurisdiction-
16As we discussed above we ignore the complication introduced by multi-plant firms. We also do not
correct for the fact that taxes vary by jurisdiction rather than establishment (Moulton, 1990).
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specific effects. We then need to be able to precisely locate these establishments so that we
can identify which pairs of establishments are neighbours. Finally, we need to identify a
local tax which is time-varying. We would prefer this tax to be economically significant to
increase the chances of detecting any impact on location and employment decisions. Data
satisfying all of these requirements is available for England for the six year period from
1984 to 1989. We first describe the establishment level data set we use before turning to
details of the particular tax that we consider.
2.1. Establishment Data
Establishment level data for years 1984 to 1989 come from the Annual Respondent Data-
base (ard) which underlies the Annual Census of Production in the uk. Collected by the
Office for National Statistics (ons), the ard is a rich data set providing information on all
uk establishments from 1973 onwards. We face two restrictions on time period. Changes
to the tax system restrict our focus to years before 1990, while changes to the ard restrict
us to years after 1983. We also restrict ourselves to English manufacturing establish-
ments.17 For every establishment, we know postcode, five-digit industrial classification,
and number of employees. In our analysis of employment we use only the information
coming from a sub-sample of ‘selected’ establishments required to make a detailed return
in any year. These establishments are generally larger and their employment information
is of better quality than for non selected establishments.18 The precise sampling frame
for selected establishments and further description of this data can be found in Griffith
(1999). In our analysis of entry we use the exhaustive data (that includes ‘selected’ and
‘non-selected’ establishments).
The postcode reported in the ard is very useful for locating establishments. In the uk,
postcodes typically refer to one property or a very small group of dwellings. The Ord-
17We ignore Scotland because it operated a different local tax system, Wales because it is not covered by
the data set that provides our instruments, and Northern Ireland because special permission is required to
access ard data for establishments located there.
18The better quality of data is not the only reason to focus on selected establishments. Implementation of
the algorithm to identify neighbours and calculate data for pairs of neighbouring establishments is infeasible
with the large samples that include non-selected establishments.
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nance Survey (os) Code-Point data set gives spatial coordinates for all uk postcodes. By
merging this data with the ard we generate very detailed information about the location
of all English manufacturing establishments. For all but a tiny percentage of matched
establishments the os acknowledges a potential location error below 100 metres. For the
remaining observations, the maximum error is a few kilometres. Overall, we expect a very
high level of precision for our location data (see Duranton and Overman, 2005, for further
discussion).
As the data requirements for our spatial differencing methodology are already some-
what restrictive, we only consider establishment specific variables that can be calculated
for all establishments. For the ard, this means only controlling for establishment age.
For establishments already in the panel in 1976 (the earliest year for which we have
information), we are unable to assess exact age. With regressions running over 1984-1989,
this truncation censors age for establishments older than 8 years in 1984. For consistency
across years, we thus construct a dummy for establishments that are 8 years or older in
1984. We also use age and age squared interacted with a dummy for being an establish-
ment younger than 8 years old.
There are 25,579 establishments in the ard that are located in England and that report
employment at least once within our study period. We make several sample restrictions.
We deleted 122 establishments where the Local Authority code was missing since we
need this to append the tax rate. We then dropped 374 establishments where we could
not identify coordinates.19 A further 723 establishments change sector during the period
and 2,547 move site (i.e., change coordinates). In both cases these changes frequently
reflect coding errors rather than genuine changes in activity or location, so we drop these
establishments. This leaves us with a sample of 21,813 establishments and a total of 61,785
19We directly identified coordinates for around 90% of establishments. The main problem for the re-
maining 10% results from the creation of new postcodes. To increase matching rates, we checked our
data against a data set of postcode updates. For observations with postcodes still unmatched, we imputed
co-ordinates as follows. In the uk, a postcode is either six or seven digits. We first drop the last digit and
assign establishments the mean coordinates of all postcodes sharing the same truncated postcode. If this
failed to produce a match, we dropped two, then three digits from the postcode and again matched on
mean coordinates where possible. This left us with 1.4% of establishments that could not be given a grid
reference.
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observations.
2.2. Local Taxation and Political Variables
As already outlined above, the tax that we consider is a property tax on non-residential
property known as the uk business rate, set and collected by jurisdictions called Local
Authorities (hereafter las). Before 1990, tax rates varied over time and jurisdictions. We
are fortunate because this tax consisted only of a flat rate that applied to all occupied
non-residential properties. This simplicity implies that the only source of variation is the
tax rate itself.
The uk business rates were subject to a major reform in 1990 which essentially elimin-
ated jurisdictional variation. This reform provides a large amount of exogenous variation
in the tax rate. Unfortunately we cannot exploit it because all properties were also reval-
ued in 1990. Since we do not know by how much each property was revalued, we cannot
compute the change in taxation faced by each establishment. Hence, as mentioned above,
while the production data restricts our study period to start in 1984, the reforms to the tax
system mean it must end in 1989.20
uk business rates represented a considerable tax on business. In 1990 the average
annual rates bill per square foot was over £4, compared with an average rent bill per
square foot of just over £13 (Bond et al., 1996). Hence rates bills make up roughly 25 per
cent of the total occupancy costs of rented commercial property. In 1992 business paid
£13bn in local rates, almost equal to the £15bn that they paid in corporation tax for the
same year.21
As a first approximation, none of this money was used to finance local services for
businesses. During the 1980s, the responsibilities of las include social and health services
for their residents, community safety, some aspects of education, housing, arts, culture,
20For a comprehensive discussion of the reforms see Hale and Travers (1994).
21Additional evidence that the tax is significant is provided by Bennett (1986) using a cost of capital
approach.
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and environment. Very little is directly provided to businesses.22 Even basic services
such as refuse collection need to be separately organised by businesses. The only la
responsibility that can affect businesses directly is planning (and some trading regulations
that affect mostly retail). Despite a national set of planning regulations, las differ in their
speed of processing applications. It is hard to believe, however, that there were substantial
within jurisdictional changes in the efficiency of local planning offices over the time period
we consider. Instead, differences with respect to planning efficiency and restrictiveness,
if they matter at all, are expected to be part of the fixed effect of these jurisdictions. Of
course, if changes to taxes are used to fund services that directly or indirectly benefit
businesses, then it is still of interest to understand the net effect.
During our period of study, tax rates were set locally by the 366 las in England, which
entirely covered its land area. Large cities comprise several las (e.g., 33 for London). The
tax paid depended on the value of the buildings occupied. The tax rates were known as
‘rate poundages’ and the value of the property including buildings as the ‘rateable value’.
We use the rate poundages as explanatory variable in our regressions. They were changed
yearly. Unless some construction took place, rateable values of buildings were fixed in
1973 and did not change until 1990. The average rate for 1987 was 229.5 pence per pound
of 1970 rateable value with a standard deviation of 32.2 pence. The ratio between the
highest business rate (Oldham in Manchester) and the lowest (Kensington and Chelsea
in London) was about three. These two las are far from each other and this difference
will not be taken into account when we spatial difference. The largest ratio between two
neighbouring las is nearly two. There was also significant time-series variation. There was
for instance an average increase in the business rates of nearly 10% between 1988 and 1989.
Over the entire period (1984− 89) the average increase was 45% with a standard deviation
of 0.15. Again looking at neighbouring las, we observe a 25% decrease in Kensington and
Chelsea against a 31% increase in neighbouring Hammersmith over the period. Overall,
22Clearly, there may be some indirect effects through, for instance, crime or education. However we
expect these effects to spill over across jurisdictions so that establishments on both sides of any border face
similar conditions.
18
there is more than sufficient variation in the data to perform our estimations.
Finally, the data on shares of political parties that we use for instrumenting, come from
the British Local Election Database which is available through the uk Data Archive. See
Rallings and Thrasher (2004).
3. Results
To show the impact of spatial differencing, we also estimate employment effects of local
taxation using standard techniques. Results for the non-spatial specifications (i.e., using
standard techniques and ignoring the micro-spatial nature of the data) are reported in
table 1. We use log employment (eit) as the dependent variable. As explanatory variables
we include log tax rate (rat), the three variables described above to capture the impact
of age (Xit) and a full set of industry-year dummies (two-digit industries) for which we
do not report coefficients.23 Table 2 reports results for comparable specifications that use
spatial differencing for establishments matched by industry and years. For the sake of
comparison, we restrict the sample to be the same for all specifications by only including
those establishments that we use to estimate our preferred specification: the instrumented,
fixed effect spatial-differencing specification discussed below (the final specification in
table 2). This restriction requires establishments to be in a pair in which both establish-
ments simultaneously report employment in at least two years.24
Starting with 21,813 establishments, 7,938 of them are dropped because they only
report employment once. Of the remaining 13,875 establishments, 8,792 have a neigh-
23Industry-year dummies allow for industries to have different µ, γ and θ. In the spatial difference
specifications we allow for this by only pairing establishments if they are part of the same industry. This
restriction in defining pairs limits the degrees of freedom sufficiently that we cannot allow α and β to differ
across industries. Thus, we impose the same assumption here to facilitate comparison. We could drop this
assumption if we paired establishments across industries. But this would impose an identical distribution
of θ across industries. As we are interested in the econometric issues arising because of the presence of θ we
prefer to impose the restriction on α and β.
24Consider an establishment that reports employment for (say) only 1987 and 1988. It is in the sample if it
has at least one neighbour and that neighbour also reports employment for these two years. We impose this
restriction because our implementation of spatial-differencing uses fixed effects for pairs. An establishment
can be part of more than one pair satisfying this condition. However, we only use each establishment once
in estimating the non-spatial specifications.
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Table 1: Non-spatial regression results
ols within within iv
(log) tax rate 0.210a 0.071b 0.363a
(0.060) (0.030) (0.104)
age censored dummy 0.569a 0.214a 0.223a
(0.091) (0.033) (0.034)
age 0.023 0.036a 0.036a
(0.047) (0.011) (0.011)
age squared 0.005 -0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Adjusted R-squared 0.12
Number of observations 13490 13490 13490
Number of establishments 4414 4414 4414
Notes: Regression of (log) employment on (log) local tax rates and age
variables. First column reports results from ols, second column (within)
allows for establishment specific fixed effects, third column (within iv)
further instruments local tax using local political variables. Standard errors
under coefficients. a, b and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level
respectively.
bour within 1 kilometre (the distance threshold that we use for our preferred reported
results). However, only 4,414 of these establishments are in at least one pair where both
establishments simultaneously report employment in at least two years. To show that this
sample is representative, Appendix B reports results for the same specifications as table 1
but different sampling rules; namely pairing establishments within 2 kilometres (instead
of 1 kilometre), using all establishments that can be paired when spatially differencing,
and using all available establishments in the data.
The first regression in table 1 reports results from estimating equation (4) using pooled
ols for 1984-1989. The results for the age variables show that, as expected, older estab-
lishments have higher employment. Our main focus, however, is on the role of taxation.
In the cross-section, higher tax rates are associated with higher employment.
As we noted above, one possible explanation of this positive correlation is that some
establishments are larger than others for unobserved reasons and larger establishments
happen to be located in higher tax jurisdictions. The second specification in table 1 allows
for this possibility by introducing an establishment-specific fixed effect and calculating the
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within estimator. The coefficient on tax rate is divided by three suggesting that much of
the positive correlation between employment and tax rate is indeed due to unobserved
characteristics of establishments. Note, however, that the effect remains positive and
significant.
The remaining problem that we need to tackle is that the tax rate may be correlated with
the error in equation (5). There are two possible sources for this correlation. First, there
may be a feedback from employment to tax rate. This feedback will be positive when local
politicians tax local business more when it is doing well. Alternatively, and working in the
opposite direction, it could be that las can afford to keep taxes low during ‘good times’. In
the uk context, this alternative may arise because good times imply a lesser need for social
expenditure. This being said, we expect the first effect to dominate and taxation to go up
when local business is doing well. Second, there may be other time-varying characteristics
that are positively correlated with both employment and tax rates and that we do not
control for through the use of establishment-specific fixed effects.
To solve these problems we use local political variables to instrument for tax rates.
The full set of instruments includes the share of local politicians affiliated with the three
main political parties (Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat), a set of dummies
indicating whether the la is controlled by one of the three main parties and a set of
interactions giving the share of the three main parties if they control the la. There are
many smaller parties that play a role in local politics and we aggregate these in to ‘other’
and treat them as the omitted category. As argued above, we expect both the identity
of the party which controls the la and its margin of control to matter. The R-squared of
the first stage regression is 69%. For the interested reader Appendix C provides further
details.25
The third column in table 1 shows what happens when we use these instruments
for the level of taxation in the fixed effects specification that we reported in column 2.
25One might be tempted to test for the validity of instruments given that we have more instruments than
endogenous regressors. We would argue, however, that such a test is invalid because all our instruments are
based on the same underlying assumption (that local politics is independent of changes to establishments’
employment).
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Surprisingly, perhaps, the coefficient on taxation increases after instrumenting. It would
be tempting to conclude that, contrary to most priors, las taxed businesses according to
jurisdictions (social) needs rather than local business’ capacity to pay. That is, there is
a negative correlation between tax rates and the omitted variables so that instrumenting
leads to a higher coefficient on taxation. Nonetheless, a positive effect with an elasticity
close to 0.4 strikes us as implausible. As we will see below it appears that this increase
in the coefficient on taxation following instrumentation occurs because the unobserved
time-varying site-specific effect is correlated with both employment and local political
variables.
Table 2 presents two sets of results (with and without corrected standard errors) for
three different spatial specifications that parallel those presented in table 1. In the first
column, we spatial difference equation (4) and estimate using ols. In the second, we
spatial difference (5) and estimate using a fixed effect for each pair of establishments.
Finally in the third column, we instrument the tax rate in the spatially differenced within
specification using spatially differenced political variables as in the non-spatial specifica-
tion.
The results use a distance threshold of 1 kilometre to identify neighbours. In our
choice of threshold, we face a tradeoff between sample size and the extent to which
the spatially varying site-specific effects are equal across neighbouring sites. We chose
the minimum threshold which gives sufficient observations to identify the effect of local
taxes (remembering that identification comes from cross jurisdiction border pairs). We use
neighbouring establishments within the same jurisdiction to improve our estimates of the
effect of establishment-specific variables.26
Note that, although the overall sample of establishments is restricted to be identical for
both the spatial and non-spatial specifications, the number of observations is higher for
the spatially differenced specifications (18,370 compared to 13,490). This is because each
26We get the same results if we restrict attention only to the 164 establishments that are part of cross-
jurisdiction border pairs. The spatially differenced within iv specification gives a coefficient of −1.072 as
opposed to the −1.024 reported in the text. Both coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2: Spatial differencing regression results, one kilometre threshold
Uncorrected standard errors
spatial difference of ols within within iv
(log) tax rate 0.846a 0.111 -1.024a
(0.225) (0.119) (0.314)
age censored dummy 0.738a 0.134a 0.132a
(0.076) (0.028) (0.028)
age 0.068c 0.042a 0.041a
(0.039) (0.009) (0.009)
age squared -0.003 -0.003a -0.003a
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Corrected standard errors
spatial difference of ols within within iv
(log) tax rate 0.846b 0.111 -1.024b
(0.379) (0.167) (0.420)
age censored dummy 0.738a 0.134a 0.132b
(0.138) (0.051) (0.049)
age 0.068 0.042a 0.041a
(0.071) (0.016) (0.015)
age squared -0.003 -0.003c -0.003a
(0.008) (0.002) (0.002)
Adjusted R-squared 0.04
Number of observations 18370 18370 18370
Number of establishments 4414 4414 4414
Number of pairs 6087 6087 6087
Notes: Regression of spatial difference of (log) employment on spatial
difference of (log) local tax rates and age variables. First column reports
results from ols, second column (within) allows for establishment specific
fixed effects, third column (within iv) further instruments local tax using
local political variables. Standard errors under coefficients. First block of
results report uncorrected standard errors. Second block of results report
standard errors corrected according to Appendix A. a, b and c denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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establishment can be involved in more than one pair. Specifically, we have 6,087 unique
pairs as compared to 4,414 unique establishments suggesting that each establishment has
on average three neighbours.27
Before turning to the individual coefficients, comparing the two blocks of results (with
and without corrected standard errors), we see the corrections outlined in Appendix A
generally increase standard errors by around 50%. In our context, this results in minor
changes in significance, but does not change overall findings. In other contexts it could,
suggesting that the correction should usually be implemented. Turning to the coeffi-
cients, we see that, apart from changes in significance, the results on the age variables
are essentially unchanged. As before, we focus on the tax rate and note that after spa-
tial differencing we get a higher correlation between (spatially differenced) tax rate and
(spatially differenced) employment than previously, with a coefficient of 0.846 compared
to 0.210 with ols. These coefficients have the same probability limit when there are no
unobserved establishment or site-specific effects, or when these effects are uncorrelated
with tax rates or other included explanatory variables. A possible reason for the higher
correlation between employment and taxation after controlling for site-specific effects is
that areas with poor sites had higher tax rates thus biasing downward the coefficient on
taxes in the non-spatial ols estimation. A correlation between having ‘poor sites’ and
higher taxes is certainly believable given that de-industrialising las tended to vote for
very left-wing councils that then greatly increased taxation.28
However, this interpretation assumes that establishment fixed effects are either absent
or uncorrelated with local tax rates. To account for possible correlation we use, as before,
the panel dimension of our data to control for unobserved establishment heterogeneity.
Column 2 of table 2 reports results when we both spatially difference and allow for
fixed effects for pairs of establishments. These pair fixed effects not only control for
27Working against this, is the fact that both establishments in the pair must simultaneously report em-
ployment data in at least two years. For this distance threshold the first effect dominates. That need not be
the case for other distance thresholds.
28Sheffield under the leadership of the (then) leftwing firebrand David Blunkett had the highest business
rate in the country in 1990 and Liverpool led by the notorious Derek Hatton ranked 12th.
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time-invariant unobserved establishment heterogeneity but also for other time-invariant
local effects such as the propensity of some jurisdictions to provide better services and
thus have consistently better performing establishments.
Comparing results across the non-spatial and spatially differenced specifications we see
that after controlling for establishment fixed effects, the coefficient on the tax rate is again
higher after spatial differencing. However because of higher standard errors, it is hard
to provide a definitive interpretation for this comparison. More significantly, comparing
across the spatially differenced specifications, we see that allowing for pair fixed effects
reduces our estimate of the positive correlation between taxation and employment relative
to the spatially differenced ols results. The coefficient even becomes insignificant. This
confirms our finding from the non-spatial specifications that establishment fixed effects
appear to be positively correlated with tax rates: las with ‘good’ establishments charge
higher taxes.
As with the non-spatial fixed effects specifications, we still want to control for the fact
that tax rates may be endogenous. To do this, we instrument using the spatial difference
of the same set of political variables that we use for the non-spatial specification. Results
are shown in column 3 of table 2. This is our preferred specification. Taxation now has
a negative effect on employment. As argued above, the difference between the spatial
and non-spatial results suggests that unobserved time-varying site-specific effects are cor-
related with both employment and local political variables. Spatial differencing removes
these site-specific effects, ensuring that our instruments are valid and thus allowing us to
identify the negative effect of taxes on establishment employment.
To assess the robustness of our results, table 3 reports results for alternative sets of
instruments. In our preferred specification, reported in column 3 of table 2 we take ‘no
overall control’ as the omitted control dummy. An alternative would be to exclude one
of the main political parties allowing the coefficients on the other parties to be directly
compared to those for the omitted party. Unfortunately, this introduces an additional
complication because there is then no ‘share’ variable that corresponds to no overall
25
control. It turns out that our results are not very sensitive to this as shown in table 3.
In column 1 of table 3 we repeat our preferred specification taking Labour as the omitted
category for both control and share. In column 2 we omit Conservatives. Both columns
leave our main result virtually unchanged. In column 3, we restrict our set of instruments
to the control dummies. This yields a coefficient on the tax rate that is larger in magnitude.
Because of larger standard errors, it is statistically undistinguishable from that in our
preferred specification. Finally, in column 4 we use only the shares as instruments. This
yields results that are similar to those of our preferred specification.
Table 3: Alternative instrumentation strategies, within iv
Labour Conservative only party only shares
omitted omitted control
(log) tax rate -0.953a -0.865a -3.240c -0.822a
(0.319) (0.317) (1.765) (0.338)
Number of observations 18370 18370 18370 18370
Number of pairs 6087 6087 6087 6087
Notes: Regression of (log) employment on (log) local tax rates and age variables. Coefficients
for the age censored dummy, age, and age squared not reported. All four columns report
within iv results. In column 1, the instruments are as in column 3 of table 2 except that Labour
is the omitted category. Column 2 duplicates regression using Conservative as the omitted
variable. Column 3 only uses party control as instruments. Column 4 only uses party shares as
instruments. Standard errors (uncorrected) under coefficients. a, b and c denote significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Table 4 duplicates the three regressions of table 2 for different distance thresholds. In
the first block of the table, the estimated coefficient on the tax rate for a threshold of 0.5 km
(instead of 1 km) is statistically insignificant in all three regressions. This is unsurprising
because this coefficient is estimated from only 83 cross border pairs instead of 298 when
using a 1 km threshold. In the second block, the results for a 1.5 km threshold are close
to those of table 2 except that the coefficient on the tax rate estimated with spatial within
iv is still negative but lower and marginally insignificant. In the third block, at the 2 km
threshold, the point estimate for this coefficient is close to zero. In the fourth block, at the
3 km threshold, it becomes positive. This gradual increase suggests that as we increase
the distance threshold there is a smooth transition from our coefficient of -1.02 obtained
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with a 1 km threshold to the coefficient of +0.36 obtained without spatially differentiating.
At the same time, the within coefficient in the second column remains stable and does not
appear to depend on our sample selection rule. The differences between these two series
of regressions are thus driven by the instrumentation itself and appear consistent with our
conjecture above that the exclusion restriction is more likely to hold for short distances.
Pulling the results together, spatial differencing offers two improvements over existing
methodologies. First, comparing the non-instrumented regressions with and without spa-
tial differencing allows us to identify the nature of the relationship between site-specific
effects and local taxation. Second, and more importantly, because spatial differencing
removes unobserved time-varying site-specific effects it makes it far easier to find valid
instruments that allows us to identify the negative relationship between local taxation
and employment. Quantitatively, spatial differencing greatly affects the results. In what
is arguably the best estimation using standard techniques (that does not control for
time-varying site-specific effects), we find a positive elasticity around 0.4. Our preferred
specification with spatial differencing reverses the sign of the coefficient and leads to an
elasticity around −1 (although not very precisely estimated). In a nutshell, instead of
a positive effect of taxation on employment spatial differencing shows a negative effect
of taxation on employment. From our model we know that this occurs because of some
combination of the growth-slowing and selection effects of higher taxes. Focusing on
entries allows us to focus specifically on the second of these effects since we expect firms
that leave a jurisdiction to be replaced by new ‘entrants’ in the data. We now turn to this
issue.
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Table 4: Spatial differencing regression results for alternative distance thresholds
spatial difference of ols within within iv
0.5 kilometre threshold
(log) tax rate -0.755 0.172 0.224
(0.542) (0.265) (0.541)
Adjusted R-squared 0.03
Number of observations 9530 9530 9530
Number of establishments 3226 3226 3226
Number of pairs 3112 3112 3112
1.5 kilometre threshold
(log) tax rate 0.582b 0.106 -0.454
(0.273) (0.131) (0.288)
Adjusted R-squared 0.04
Number of observations 35762 35762 35762
Number of establishments 6386 6386 6386
Number of pairs 11753 11753 11753
2 kilometre threshold
(log) tax rate 0.426c 0.156 -0.040
(0.231) (0.108) (0.249)
Adjusted R-squared 0.04
Number of observations 49578 49578 49578
Number of establishments 7273 7273 7273
Number of pairs 16654 16654 16654
3 kilometre threshold
(log) tax rate 0.448b 0.131 0.117
(0.188) (0.088) (0.198)
Adjusted R-squared 0.04
Number of observations 81211 81211 81211
Number of establishments 8518 8518 8518
Number of pairs 26661 26661 26661
Notes: Regression of spatial difference of (log) employment on spatial
difference of (log) local tax rates and age variables. Coefficients for the age
censored dummy, age, and age squared not reported. First column reports
results from ols, second column (within) allows for establishment specific
fixed effects, third column (within iv) further instruments local tax using
local political variables. Corrected standard errors (according to Appendix
A) under coefficients. First block reports results for 0.5 km threshold, second
block for 1.5 km, third block for 2 km, and fourth block for 3 km. a, b and c
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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4. Entries
4.1. Methodology and Data
We now turn to the effects of local taxation on entry.29 This is an important issue for
three reasons. First, the rate at which new establishments enter las is an important
outcome that deserves attention. Second, our employment estimates confound selection
and growth slow-down effects as made clear by our model. Assuming the supply of sites
is fixed and that the land market clears so that exits are matched with entries, an analysis
of entries offers an opportunity to focus specifically on selection effects. Third spatial
differencing provides solutions to the same three problems (establishment heterogeneity,
site heterogeneity, and endogeneity) that we addressed when looking at employment
growth. However, there are subtle differences which are worth highlighting.
Consider establishment i that wishes to enter in year t. It can choose between all avail-
able sites, indexed by z. As before, the jurisdiction that sets the tax for the establishment
depends on the site occupied, and is indexed by a. Profit maximisation can be performed
in two stages. First, establishment i computes the highest profit it can achieve, Πiz, at each
site z. It then selects the site offering the highest profit.30 We assume that the highest profit
for establishment i entering in year t at site z can be written as:
Πizt = λrat + Zitζ + νi + κa + ϕzt + eizt (9)
where νi is an establishment fixed effect, κa is a jurisdiction fixed effect, Zit are explanatory
variables at the establishment level, ϕzt is a site-specific effect, and eizt is an establishment
site-specific shock.31 Establishment i will choose the site z that gives the highest expected
29Rathelot and Sillard (2008) develop an analysis of the effect of a local tax on capital on entries using a
similar approach. Details of the implementation differ.
30We ignore any possible interaction between the location decisions of entrants. This seems reasonable in
established manufacturing industries where existing establishments drive local wages, determine product
market competition etc. As discussed in the text, the fact that the effect on profits of these factors will be
highly correlated across neighbouring sites then justifies our approach.
31The establishment fixed effect, νi, mirrors µi in (4). Similarly the jurisdiction effect, κa, and the site-
specific effect, ϕzt, are the counterparts of γa and θzt. Finally both (9) and (4) contain coefficients for the
effect of local taxation (λ and α) and establishment-level variables (ζ and β). Note that our approach for
entries is also consistent with a more general setting where the specification includes variables that are
individual-site-specific, φizt, in addition to individual effects, νi, and site effects, ϕzt.
29
profit. When the shocks eizt follow an appropriate iid extreme value distribution, the
probability of choosing site z, Pizt, is logistic and is given by
Pizt =
exp E(Πizt)
∑Zz=1 exp E(Πizt)
(10)
where E (·) is the expectation operator and the summation is across all possible sites Z.
The standard approach to estimating the coefficients λ and ζ is to ignore the site-
specific effect, ϕzt, and estimate a conditional logit model. To do this, one creates a set
of establishment-jurisdiction observations and defines cia = 1 if establishment i locates in
jurisdiction a and cia = 0 otherwise. The coefficients can then be estimated by maximising
the log likelihood of the conditional logit model:
log Lcl =
I
∑
i=1
A
∑
a=1
cia log Pia (11)
where for simplicity we drop the time subscripts as establishments only enter once.
As is well recognised, application of the conditional logit model can be problematic
when the set of possible jurisdictions is large. One solution is to take a random sub-sample
of jurisdictions, although this has implications for the efficiency of the estimator and
the small sample properties are unknown. Another possibility, recently proposed by
Guimaraes et al. (2003) is to use the fact that, under certain conditions, the log likelihood
of the Poisson model is identical to that of the conditional logit. Estimating a Poisson re-
gression is computationally much easier, though the equivalence between the likelihoods
only holds in the absence of establishment specific variables (i.e., Zit). In any case both
solutions ignore the site-specific effects. As we now show, spatial differencing provides
an alternative which controls for site-specific effects and which, in other contexts, would
allow for the inclusion of establishment specific variables.
Our approach is as follows. Consider two neighbouring sites, z1 and z2, close to the
border between two jurisdictions a1 and a2. z1 is located in jurisdiction a1 and z2 in a2.
Since the two locations are close, we assume ϕz1t ≈ ϕz2t. This is the same identification
assumption made in section 1 to derive our employment specification (8). To repeat,
this assumption is justified by the fact that site-specific effects (labour market conditions,
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access to markets and major facilities, etc) vary smoothly across space. The probability of
choosing z1 conditional on locating in one of these two neighbouring sites is:
P (i ∈ z1 |i ∈ {z1,z2} ) =
Piz1
Piz1 + Piz2
(12)
When the shocks eizt follow an appropriate iid extreme value distribution, the probability
of choosing one of the sites is logistic and is given by:
P (i ∈ z1 |i ∈ {z1,z2} ) = 11+ exp(λ (ra2t − ra1t) + κa2 − κa1)
(13)
Note that unlike equation (10) above, this specification conditions out both establishment-
and site-specific effects because these effects are the same at locations z1 and z2.32 Recall
that in standard conditional logit models observed site-specific factors are computation-
ally hard to deal with. By contrast our approach directly conditions out both observed
and unobserved site-specific factors in a way that is easy to implement. In addition, we do
not need to rely on the assumption of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives which
underlies the conditional logit model. This is a distinct advantage as this assumption is
unlikely to hold in spatial settings (see, for example, Head and Mayer, 2004).
Equation (13) only involves jurisdictional level variables so we can estimate λ directly
from an aggregate logit model where the observation units are the (border-side, time)
pairs.33 In the estimation, the observations are weighted by the number of entrants for
consistency with equation (13).
In a nutshell, we select entrants located close to jurisdictional boundaries and examine
their decision to choose to locate on one particular side of the border. The main conceptual
difference with our employment regression (8) is that we consider the location decision of
a new establishment choosing between neighbouring jurisdictions rather than comparing
the employment outcomes for (existing) neighbouring establishments. For entry, this is
32We assumed in (9) that the effect of establishment characteristics did not depend on location. However
our spatial differentiation approach is more powerful than this since any interaction between establishment
and site characteristics is conditioned out by spatial differencing provided the characteristics of the local
environment vary smoothly over space.
33We need to estimate 366 jurisdiction dummies. These dummies are identified from the time variation in
entry rates at the borders.
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the appropriate way to control for both time invariant establishment specific effects and
any unobserved site-specific effects common to both sides of a border.34 As local tax
rates do not vary smoothly across space at jurisdictional boundaries, we can use entrants
on either side of these boundaries to identify the effect of taxes after conditioning out
time-varying site-specific factors and time-invariant establishment-specific effects. In-
terestingly one step is enough to eliminate both establishment and site effects for entry,
whereas two steps are necessary when studying employment. This reflects the fact that
instead of comparing each establishment with a matched establishment on the other side
of the border we compare each establishment with itself on the two sides of the border
making the within transformation redundant. In passing, we note that the same idea
cannot be used for exits.35
As with the employment specifications, endogeneity must also be addressed since the
local tax rate may be simultaneously determined with the rate of entry. To control for
this, we estimate a two-stage iv logit model instrumenting the difference in tax rate,
ra2t − ra1t, in the logit specification, with the predicted difference in tax rate from a first
stage regression using spatially-differenced local political variables. The simplicity of this
method comes at a price because correcting the errors to allow for possible correlation
between the residual of the instrumentation equation and that of the entry equation is not
straightforward.36
34To see this, note that when choosing between two neighbouring sites, the entrant compares profits
between them. Time-varying site-specific factors, which vary smoothly across space, will affect profits at
both sites in the same way. Hence, these factors do not enter into the location decision. A similar argument
applies to unobserved time-invariant establishment characteristics.
35Indeed, we can observe the exit of an establishment only on the side of the border where it entered.
Hence, unlike with entry, we cannot compare an establishment with itself on both sides of a border. Al-
ternatively, one might want to apply the same methodology as for employment by matching establishments
with their closest neighbour(s). However, since establishments exit only once, we would not be able to
control for establishment unobserved heterogeneity.
36As an alternative, we used an iv probit model that estimates the entry and instrumenting equation
simultaneously. This approach corrects standard errors but at the cost that it is not fully consistent with
the theoretical specification. The results are the same as with the two-stage logit model.
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4.2. Results
To construct the entry data, we need to detect all entrants in the ard. Because of a change
in 1984 in the way the registry of establishments was constructed, there is a large amount
of artificial entry in 1984 and 1985 (i.e., establishments enter the data set for the first time
during those two years even though they already existed prior to 1984). See Griffith (1999)
for further discussion. As a result, we ignore entries for these two years and focus instead
on 81,042 newly reporting establishments between 1986 and 1989.
For consistency with the employment regressions we would like to identify all entrants
within 1 kilometre of jurisdiction boundaries. The easiest way to do this would be to draw
1 kilometre buffers around boundaries. Lacking a set of digital boundaries for this time
period, we instead proceed indirectly and identify the set of border entrants from the ard
itself. To do this, for each entrant we searched for the closest establishment located in
each of the neighbouring las and retained only those entrants that had such a neighbour
within one kilometre. Since this detection procedure is only meant to compute distances
to the la border for each entrant (rather than find a match for a pair), we considered all
possible establishments in all sectors and all years as potential neighbours. We expect this
procedure to catch nearly all entrants located within one kilometre of a border.
As for employment, we implement both the standard methodology (i.e., conditional
logit) and our spatial differencing approach. Results for two non-spatial specifications,
are given in columns 1 and 2 of table 5 while columns 3 and 4 report results for two
comparable spatial specifications. Again, for the sake of comparison, we have restricted
the sample to be the same for all specifications. This restriction requires establishments
to locate within 1 kilometre of a boundary between two English las between 1986 and
1989. Imposing this requirement leaves us with a sample of 19,337 establishments. To
show that this sample is representative, Appendix B once again reports results for the
same specifications but without imposing this restriction.
Starting with the conditional logit we see, from the results reported in column 1, that
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Table 5: Results for entries
cl cl iv logit logit iv
(log) tax rate 0.397a 0.521 0.108 0.809
(0.079) (0.883) (0.177) (0.921)
Number of entrants 19,337 19,337 19,337 19,337
Notes: Number of entrants as a function of local tax rates. First column
(cl) reports results for conditional logit, second column (cl iv) instruments
local taxes using political variables, third column (logit) reports results
from a logit model for spatially differenced variables; fourth column (logit
iv) instruments local taxes. Standard errors under coefficients. a, denotes
significance at the 1% level. Estimates in the first two columns are from a
Poisson regression using the equivalence result from Guimaraes et al. (2003).
there appears to be a positive effect of tax rates on entry. Column 2 shows what happens
when we correct for endogeneity by replacing the actual tax rates with the predicted tax
rates from a first stage regression of tax rates on political variables. Once instrumenting,
we find that the coefficient increases but it also becomes insignificant because of a much
higher standard error. Correcting the standard errors to allow for the fact that we are
instrumenting would only reinforce this finding.37 Columns 3 and 4 show that we reach
the same conclusions for entry using our spatially differenced approach.
A positive effect of local taxation on entries (although insignificant) might seem sur-
prising in light of its negative effect on employment. Nonetheless, having a positive effect
of taxation on entries is consistent with our model. Recall that higher taxes lead to more
exits and relocations. This creates vacant sites. In turn, these vacant sites are occupied by
new entrants. Overall, our findings about entries are suggestive that the selection effect
highlighted by the model plays a role. This selection effect might be more complicated
than in our model. In particular, it could be that exiting and relocating establishments in
high tax jurisdictions are large and capital intensive. They might be replaced by smaller
and less capital intensive firms which are less sensitive to high local taxes. We also note
that our model assumes that the supply of sites is fixed. The development of new sites
37Hence our decision only to implement the theoretically consistent two stage conditional logit procedure
rather than an instrumented probit specification.
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might be negatively affected by high local taxes (a force countering our selection effect).38
5. Conclusion
We propose a new approach to assess the effects of local taxation. Our results show
the importance of controlling for both unobserved establishment-specific and unobserved
site-specific characteristics and possible simultaneity. Simple ols results suggest a positive
relationship between employment and taxes. Allowing for unobserved establishment-
specific effects and instrumenting for local taxation, we still find a positive relationship
between employment and taxes. Allowing for unobserved location-specific effects and
instrumenting for local taxation, we find a negative significant relationship between em-
ployment and taxes. By contrast we find that local taxation has no effect on the entry of
new establishments.
Beyond our methodological contribution, this analysis also suggests that the study of
local taxation and, more broadly, that of decentralised public intervention faces serious
endogeneity problems whereby local public decisions depend strongly on very local con-
ditions, which are extremely difficult to control for. As shown here, properly controlling
for such local conditions is a necessary condition to obtain reliable estimates.
The second broad lesson is that even taxes that are seemingly close to an ‘ideal’ tax that
would be free of distortion can in practice generate significant distortions. Despite the
fact that the uk business rates were close to George’s (1884) ’pure’ land tax, revaluations
in case of expansions and frictions in the rental market implied that increases in local
taxation had an adverse effect on employment.
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38We could also imagine that jurisdictions where more new sites can be developed raise taxes to maximise
tax revenue. This could lead to a positive correlation between new developments and taxes. This should
normally be corrected by our instrumentation strategy.
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Appendix A. Correction of the Standard Errors
When spatially differencing, an establishment i that has n neighbours will be in n pairs.
This induces correlation in the error for all n of these pairs. The correlation arises because
eit (the error of establishment i) enters the error of each pair. This imposes a particular
structure to the covariance matrix which we use to correct the standard error. This ap-
pendix gives the details of that correction. Note that Bertrand et al. (2004) consider similar
issues when proposing their correction for the standard errors of difference-in-difference
estimators to measure treatment effects. There are several key differences between our
correction and the one proposed there. First, their correction is difficult to apply to spe-
cifications with a large number of establishments and locations because they estimate the
treatment effect directly without rewriting the model in difference-in-difference. Second,
their correction requires the covariance matrix to be block diagonal. This means that it is
not applicable to situations, like ours, where there is no obvious way to construct closed
sets of neighbours (because establishment A may be a neighbour to establishment B, who
may be neighbour to C, etc). In short we deal with an error structure which is considerably
more complex. This comes at a cost: we ignore issues arising from serial correlation of the
errors that are the key concern of that paper.
After spatial-differentiation and within-pair projection, the model can be re-written as
follows:
W∆e = αW∆r +W∆Xβ+W∆e (a1)
= Zγ+W∆e (a2)
where for any variable vit, observations have been stacked in pair and time order, γ′ =(
α,β′
)′ and Z = (W∆r,W∆X). The ols estimator is then:
γ̂ =
(
Z′Z
)−1 Z′∆e = γ+ (Z′Z)−1 Z′∆e (a3)
We suppose that the residuals eit are iid with variance σ2. The variance of the ols estimator
is:
V (γ̂) = σ2ABA (a4)
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where A = (Z′Z)−1 and B = Z′∆∆′Z. Matrix A is easy to compute since Z can be obtained
after spatial-differenciation and a projection within-pair of the explanatory variables. Mat-
rix B can also be computed after using an algorithm to obtain∆′Z. This algorithm relies on
the fact that ∆ has a simple structure. Indeed, denote p ∈ {1,...,P} where P is the number
of pairs and Np the number of years that pair p appears in the data. We can decompose ∆
in blocks such that ∆ = (∆′1,...,∆
′
P)
′ where, for instance, block ∆ p writes:
... 0 1 0 ... 0 −1 0 ... ...
... 0 0 1 0 ... 0 −1 0 ...
... 0 0 0 1 0 ... 0 −1 ...
 (a5)
(supposing Np = 3). The first line corresponds to the first year that the pair is in the
data, the second line to the second year, etc... Each column of ∆ can contain the values
1 and −1 several times depending on the number of times an establishment has been
matched with neighbours in the corresponding year. For a column i of ∆, denote ji the
identifier of the corresponding establishment and ti the corresponding date. If estab-
lishment is the vector containing all the establishment identifiers and year is the vector
containing the years, ji and ti can be retrieved from the first element in column i that
takes a value different from 0. For example, in the gauss language, column i of ∆ is then
of the form (establishment .eq establishment [ji]). ∗ (year .eq year[ti]) − (establishmentn .eq
establishment [ji]). ∗ (yearn .eq year[ti]) where establishmentn contains the identifier of the
neighbouring establishments and yearn their years. Element (n,k) of ∆′Z can be computed
using column n of ∆ and column k of Z. The whole matrix ∆′Z is obtained from a loop
over n and k.
We now propose an estimator of σ2. Denote Ŵ∆e the vector of residuals from the ols
estimation. We have:
Ŵ∆e = W∆e− Zγ̂ = MZW∆e (a6)
where MZ is the projector in the dimension orthogonal to Z. We then get:
Ŵ∆e
′
Ŵ∆e = e′∆′WMZW∆e (a7)
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From this formula, we obtain:
E
(
Ŵ∆e
′
Ŵ∆e
)
= Etr
(
Ŵ∆e
′
Ŵ∆e
)
(a8)
= σ2tr
(
∆′W∆
)− σ2tr [Z (Z′Z)−1 Z′∆∆′W] (a9)
= σ2tr
(
W∆∆′
)− σ2tr (AB) (a10)
We can recover tr (AB) very easily from A and B. It is also possible to simplify the
expression: tr (W∆∆′). We can write ∆∆′ in blocks corresponding to pairs. Indeed, the
(p,q)-block writes: ∆ p∆′q . W is block diagonal. Thus, the (p,q)-block of W∆∆′ writes
Wp∆ p∆′q where Wp is the (p,p)-block of W. Hence, we get: tr (W∆∆′) = ∑
p
tr
(
Wp∆ p∆′p
)
.
As we have ∆ p∆′p = 2ITp and tr
(
Wp
)
= Tp − 1 (where Tp is the number of years that pair
p appears in the data), we finally get: tr (W∆∆′) = 2 (N − P). An unbiased (and consistent)
estimator of σ2 is then:
σ̂2 =
1
2 (N − P)− tr (AB)Ŵ∆e
′
Ŵ∆e (a11)
We can finally deduce an estimator of the variance of γ̂:
V̂ (γ̂) = σ̂2ABA (a12)
We now compute the standard errors when instrumenting. The model is:
W∆e = αW∆r +W∆Xβ+W∆e (a13)
W∆r = Yδ+ ξ (a14)
with Y = W∆P where P are some political variables, and cov (Y,ξ) = cov (Y,W∆e) = 0
by assumption. Denote δ̂ the ols estimator of δ obtained from equation (a14) and
V = V̂
(
δ̂ |X
)
an estimator of its covariance. This covariance estimator may simply be
the usual ols estimator. It may also take into account clusters at the jurisdiction level.
Equation (a13) rewrites:
W∆e = αYδ̂+W∆Xβ+W∆e+ φ (a15)
= Z˜γ+W∆e+ φ (a16)
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with Z˜ =
(
Yδ̂,W∆X
)
and φ = α
(
Yδ−Yδ̂
)
. φ is such that E (φ |X,Y ) = 0 and
V (φ |X,Y ) = α2YVY′ with V = V
(
δ̂ |Y
)
. The iv estimator is:
γ̂IV =
(
Z˜′Z˜
)−1
Z˜′W∆e = γ+
(
Z˜′Z˜
)−1
Z˜′ (W∆e+ φ) (a17)
Assuming that δ̂ is known, the variance of the IV estimator can be approximated by:
V (γ̂IV) ≈
(
Z˜′Z˜
)−1
Z˜′
(
σ2W∆∆′W + α2YVY′
)
Z˜
(
Z˜′Z˜
)−1
(a18)
≈ A˜
(
σ2B˜ + α2C˜
)
A˜ (a19)
with A˜ =
(
Z˜′Z˜
)−1
, B˜ = Z˜′W∆∆′WZ˜ and C˜ = Z˜′YVY′Z˜. A˜ and B˜ are easy to compute
(see the ols case). C˜ is also easy to compute since we can first compute Y′Z˜, which has
a small dimension. We now propose an estimator of σ2. Denote Ŵ∆e+ φ the vector of
residuals from the iv second-stage estimation. We have:
Ŵ∆e+ φ
′
Ŵ∆e+ φ = (W∆e+ φ)′ MZ˜ (W∆e+ φ) (a20)
Consider for a while that Z is non random (i.e., δ̂ is non random). We have:
E(Ŵ∆e+ φ
′
Ŵ∆e+ φ) = trE
(
e′∆′WMZ˜W∆e
)
+ trE
(
φ′MZ˜φ
)
(a21)
= σ2
[
2(N − P)− tr(A˜B˜)
]
+ α2
[
tr(VY′Y)− tr(A˜C˜)
]
(a22)
A (consistent) estimator of σ2 is then:
σ̂2IV =
Ŵ∆e+ φ
′
Ŵ∆e+ φ− α̂2IV
[
tr
(
V̂Y′Y
)
− tr
(
A˜ ̂˜C)]
2 (N − P)− tr
(
A˜B˜
) (a23)
with V̂ an estimator of V obtained from the first-stage equation, ̂˜C = Z˜′YV̂Y′Z˜. Note that
when the residuals ξ it are iid with variance θ
2, we have tr
(
V̂Y′Y
)
= Nθ̂
2
and tr
(
A˜ ̂˜C) =
θ˜
2
tr
(
PZ˜PY
)
. The estimator of σ2 becomes:
σ̂2IV =
Ŵ∆e+ φ
′
Ŵ∆e+ φ− α̂2IV θ̂
2
[N − tr (PZ˜PY)]
2 (N − P)− tr
(
A˜B˜
) (a24)
Finally, the variance of the iv estimator can be approximated by:
V̂ (γ̂IV) = A˜
(
σ̂2IV B˜ + α̂
2
IV
̂˜C) A˜ (a25)
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Appendix B. Non-spatial Results for Different Samples of Establish-
ments
Tables Appendix B.1, Appendix B.2, and Appendix B.3 present results for the non-spatial
employment specifications using less restrictive samples than those used in the text. These
results should be compared to those in table 1, where establishments must be (i) in a pair
with a matched establishment within one kilometre and this pair must be such that (ii)
both establishments simultaneously report employment in at least two years (the sample
used for our preferred specification). Table Appendix B.1 uses a 2 kilometre cutoff (instead
of 1 km) to pair establishments. That is, we relax restriction (i) and retain restriction (ii).
Table Appendix B.2 uses the largest possible sample of establishments that are part of a
pair. That is, we impose restriction (i) but not restriction (ii). Table Appendix B.3 uses the
largest possible sample for each specification imposing neither restriction (i) or (ii). As can
be seen from the comparison of tables 1, Appendix B.1, Appendix B.2, and Appendix B.3
all point estimates are of the same sign and do not significantly differ from each other.
Table Appendix B.1: Non-spatial regression results for all establishments with a 2 km pairing
cutoff
ols within within iv
(log) tax rate 0.139a 0.117a 0.337a
(0.047) (0.023) (0.078)
age censored dummy 0.584a 0.295a 0.300a
(0.070) (0.025) (0.025)
age 0.038 0.057a 0.059a
(0.037) (0.008) (0.008)
age squared 0.003 -0.003a -0.003a
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Adjusted R-squared 0.13
Number of observations 22387 22387 22387
Number of establishments 7273 7273 7273
Notes: Standard errors under coefficients. a, b and c denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Sample restricted as in table 1 except for
the use of a two kilometre cutoff (instead of 1 km).
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Table Appendix B.2: Non-spatial regression results for largest possible samples of establishments
in pairs
ols within within iv
(log) tax rate 0.156a 0.105a 0.472a
(0.042) (0.023) (0.080)
age censored dummy 0.662a 0.208a 0.211a
(0.054) (0.025) (0.025)
age 0.004 0.046a 0.047a
(0.030) (0.008) (0.008)
age squared 0.008b -0.002a -0.003a
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Adjusted R-squared 0.13
Number of observations 25579 22803 22803
Number of establishments 5564 5852 5852
Notes: Standard errors under coefficients. a, b and c denote significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Sample restricted to establishments
that are part of a pair. First column (ols) only restricted by data availability.
Second and third column require at least two observations per establishment.
Compare to table 1 where establishments must be (i) in a pair in which (ii)
both establishments simultaneously report employment in at least two years.
Table Appendix B.3: Non-spatial regression results for largest possible samples
ols within within iv
(log) tax rate 0.222a 0.131a 0.481a
(0.029) (0.016) (0.062)
age censored dummy 0.652a 0.290a 0.294a
(0.033) (0.016) (0.015)
age -0.015 0.053a 0.055a
(0.018) (0.005) (0.005)
age squared 0.011a -0.002a -0.003a
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Adjusted R-squared 0.13
Number of observations 61785 53684 53684
Number of establishments 21813 13875 13875
Notes: Standard errors under coefficients. a, b and c denote significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Largest possible sample. First
column (ols) only restricted by data availability. Second and third column
require at least two observations per establishment. Compare to table 1
where establishments must be (i) in a pair in which (ii) both establishments
simultaneously report employment in at least two years.
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Table Appendix B.4 present results for the non-spatial entry specifications using all
entrants. These results should be compared to those in table 5, where establishments must
enter within 1 kilometre of an la boundary to be part of the sample. All point estimates
are of the same sign and do not significantly differ from each other.
Table Appendix B.4: Non-spatial regression results for largest possible sample
cl cl iv
(log) tax rate 0.633a 0.267
(0.070) (0.244)
Number of establishments 81,042 81,042
Notes: Number of entrants as a function of local tax rates. First column (cl)
reports results for conditional logit, second column (cl iv) instruments local
taxes using political variables. Largest possible sample. Standard errors
under coefficients. a, denotes significance at the 1% level. Estimates are from
a Poisson regression using the equivalence result from Guimaraes et al. (2003).
Appendix C. First Stage Regression
Table Appendix C.1 presents the results from the first stage regression of spatially dif-
ference (log) tax rates on the exogenous variables and spatially differenced instruments.
We present the within version that is used for instrumenting the spatially differenced
specification in the text and report both corrected and uncorrected standard errors.
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Table Appendix C.1: First stage regression results
spatial difference of (1) (2)
age censored dummy -0.0029 -0.0029
(0.0036) (0.0036)
age -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.0011) (0.0011)
age squared 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
share Conservative 0.1279a 0.1279a
(0.0436) (0.0482)
share Labour 0.2466a 0.2466a
(0.0429) (0.0470)
share Liberals 0.1236a 0.1236a
(0.0394) (0.0426)
Conservative controlled 0.0813a 0.0813a
(0.0178) (0.0226)
Labour controlled -0.1715a -0.1715a
(0.0154) (0.0173)
Liberal controlled -0.1376a -0.1376a
(0.0244) (0.0281)
share Conservative (if control) -0.2278a -0.2278a
(0.0325) (0.0431)
share Labour (if control) 0.2645a 0.2645a
(0.0317) (0.0355)
share Liberal (if control) 0.2659a 0.2659a
(0.0428) (0.0497)
Number of observations 18370 18370
Number of establishments 6087 6087
Notes: Standard errors under coefficients. a, b and c denote significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Results from first stage regression
of spatial difference of tax rates on establishment fixed effects, exogenous
variables and political instruments. Column (1) presents results with
uncorrected standard errors. Column (2) presents results with standard errors
corrected according to Appendix A.
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